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Abstract:
This paper seeks to explore country development in the context of historical circumstances. Like
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in their book, Why Nations Fail, I will use a framework
focusing on institutions and politics that looks at the historical existence of colonialism in order
to relate Venezuela’s current problems-such as an overdependence on primary goods and
political authoritarianism-with the political and economic institutions that developed from
colonialism.
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What is the best way to understand the political and economic development of Venezuela?
This question stems from the urgency and relevance of the needs of policy-makers, nongovernmental organizations, and invested citizens to understand correctly the organization of
their societies and by that understanding prescribe or proscribe alternative realities. Normative
needs’ notwithstanding, further political-economic understanding can give way to more
empirical approaches that can also provide a more ‘objective’ or holistic analysis. In recognition
of this relevance, the approach this article will primarily base itself off will be that presented by
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in their 2012 publication, Why Nations Fail. Acemoglu
and Robinson’s main units of analysis are politics and institutions. With Venezuela currently
experiencing points of social distress such as an overdependence on primary goods exports
(namely, oil) and authoritarianism, an emphasis on politics and institutions has the potential to
provide a cohesive relationship between Venezuela’s roots in Spanish colonization to where it is
now. Still, to achieve a more holistic analysis my approach will also take into consideration other
frameworks for understanding political economy in Venezuela, as epitomized by developmental
economist Jeffrey Sach’s “clinical economics” and the resulting debates’ with Acemoglu and
Robinson. Underlying both of these approach is the basic intuition that societies, and by
extension their political and economic representations, are as much a result of past decisions and
events as they are of contemporary existence (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Therefore, it is
entirely plausible that prior political and economic representations could endure or influence
societal organization across time and the behavior of social actors (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2012). It is the author’s hope that this paper can shed further light on such matters.
With an eye to understanding how and why Venezuela has developed across time, the
debates between Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson, and Jeffrey Sachs provide a good starting
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point from which to explore the general literature on national development. As understood here,
their debates center on the appropriate methodology through which to understand economic
development and social prosperity. Or at least, this is about as much as is agreed on by them:
“We think, and perhaps Sachs disagrees, a framework that says there are 17 factors, each of
them hugely important is no framework at all. The power of a framework [for studying
development] comes from its ability to focus on the most important elements at the exclusion of
the rest and in doing so providing a way of thinking about these elements, how they function,
how they have come about, and how they change. For us, those elements were related to
institutions and politics, and we have focused on them.”
“Response to Jeffrey Sachs”, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson

Acemoglu and Robinson propose that how politics develop in society has an integral role in
how its government and economy form (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Specifically, their
focus begins on whether politics develop in such a way that is pluralistic and accountable to
society (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). To the degree that society has the chance to be included
in governmental decision-making it also can constrain governance in a way that reinforces
representative decision-making (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).
The impact of pluralism and accountability go beyond political institutions though. Because
market behavior is in large part defined by political constraints, the “rules of the game” shaping
the hand of political institutions play a role in shaping the invisible hand of the marketplace as
well (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Contrarily, if politics develop in a way that is not broadly
representative or accountable, the result can be processes that will generally lead to governance
that concentrates not only its political decision-making but also its economic decision-making,
typically among political elites (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).
Acemoglu & Robinson formalize this framework in terms of inclusive or extractive political
and economic institutions. As suggested earlier, inclusive political institutions are broadly
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representative of their societies but also constrained by that representativeness. Their alternate,
extractive political institutions, is what occurs when either of these criteria fail (Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2012).
How this dichotomy applies to economic institutions has also been previously stated. As an
addition, Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) further specify what it means to be an inclusive
economic institution by emphasizing equality of opportunity and protection of property rights of
individuals; extractive economic institutions do the opposite, with economic prosperity being
available only for a minority of individuals whose ability to accumulate wealth takes on a
redistributive nature, but from society to economic elites (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). The
ideal for Acemoglu & Robinson is thus a combination of inclusive political and economic
institutions which ensure individual incentives to innovate competitively, as well as connecting
those individuals to the representative institutions that can influence the constraints on
governments, markets, and society.
What makes Jeffrey Sachs a worthwhile counterpoint here is the extent to which he
represents the mainstay of literature that explains development. This is done by his more allencompassing approach to development. In the End of Poverty, Sachs begins with the agreement
that institutions and their policies are without a doubt relevant to making sense of country
development, but, that is to be considered alongside other variables, such as physical geography,
macroeconomic instability, or the proliferation of diseases (Sachs, 2005). What variable is most
important thus depends on the context of development, termed “differential diagnosis” (Sachs,
2012). In fact, there are a great deal other variables other supplementing politics and institutions
that Sachs accounts for, as evidenced by the below table reproduced from the End of Poverty:
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Table 1: "Checklist for Making a Differential Diagnosis" Jeffrey
Sachs, the End of Poverty

Termed “differential diagnosis”, Sachs likens his approach to that of a doctor, with the
holistic and “clinically economic” approach meant to yield a much more individualized and
comprehensive result instead of focusing narrowly on institutions and their politics (Sachs,
2012).
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While Acemoglu and Robinson’s framework will form the bulk of my analysis, Sachs’
perspective provides a good starting point for understanding Venezuelan development. Despite
being discovered by Christopher Columbus as Tierra Firme in 1498, Venezuelan colonization
was not particularly important to the Spaniards until the mid-1600’s. In fact, such was the
perceived importance of Venezuelan colonization that, under pressure from mounting royal
debts, the King Carlos I of Spain in 1526 signed over resource rights for almost 30 years to a
group of German bankers (Tarver & Frederick, 2005). Gold and silver was on the mind of
Spanish colonizers, which early expeditions in Venezuela decisively failed to produce. Exports
from the city of Caracas, then as now a focal point for Venezuela, illustrate this pronounced lack:

Table 2: Caracas Exports, 1607

From this segment it seems clear that rather than politics driving geography, geography here
is the best indicator of development. So while indeed the discovery of pearls off the Venezuelan
coast drew some attention from Spanish merchants, the lack of more precious metals such as
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gold and silver drew most colonial efforts elsewhere (Haggerty & Blutstein, 1993). That is, until
the discovery of plentiful groves of cacao trees, which led to substantial increases in Venezuelan
colonial development, as cacao exports more than doubled over a period of twenty years and
eventually came to make up (along with cowhides) 97% of all exports from Venezuelan
territories by the 1650’s (Ferry, 1989; Tarver & Frederick, 2005). With Venezuelan development
thus being highly contingent on agriculture, Sachs certainly seems vindicated in drawing our
focus away from politics and institutions, even if briefly.
And yet, Acemoglu & Robinson would have much to say from here. First and foremost,
underlying the success of cacao exports were basic colonial institutions that extractive-ly
mediated Venezuelan economic activity across most of the colonial period. This extraction of
resources and power emanated from the Spanish Crown seeking to ensure that political power
began with peninsulares (native Spaniards), and only extended as far as criollos, individuals of
Spanish-descent born in colonial America (Tarver & Frederick, 2005). Peninsulares were
awarded the top administrative and royal positions while criollos dominated the cabildos, or
town councils. These cabildos then formed the basis for local governance (Tarver & Frederick,
2005). However, even prior to the existence of cabildos were the encomienda and hacienda. The
encomienda acted as the chief economic and political instrument for colonial domination early
on in Spanish America, because it acted as a grant for control over a plot of land and its’
inhabitants. Its private-sector cousin, the hacienda, evolved with the encomienda but proved
more durable for criollo and Spaniard wealth through the privatized nature of the land holding
(Lockhart, 1969).

6

Colonialism in the land of Bolivar: an analysis of institutional persistence in Venezuela
Stefan Martinez-Ruiz

All extractive, the culminating effect of these political and economic institutions was to
create a mercantilist system by and for Spanish and criollo elites. By the logic of mercantilism,
the Spanish Crown sought to accumulate capital and power at the expense of other territories
(Chasteen, 2011). In Spanish America this was accomplished in two steps: the first was to
monopolize Venezuelan exports for only Spain. The second was to ensure a situation where the
colonial territory imported more than it exported, creating a trade ‘debt’ which it owed to Spain.
The resulting deficit would then be covered by gold and silver, as the chart below illustrates:

Table 3: "The Terms of Trade in the Colonial Economic System" Victor Thomas, the Economic
History of Latin America since Independence

Across Latin America (and the colonized world generally), what enabled this process was the
unmanufactured nature of the export (Ripley, 2007). Because manufacturing (i.e. processing) a
raw good adds value, the resulting good is worth more. What makes this detrimental to trade is
after it is sold back to the exporting nation, where a net loss results through the price difference
of import and export purchases. These terms of trade can be described as not only detrimental for
Latin American countries, but in an institutional sense reflect an extractive nature by perpetually
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indebting them (Ripley, 2007). Acemoglu & Robinson point out the self-reinforcing nature of
these patterns developed by colonial institutions: the economic extraction of resources and
wealth feeds the political extraction of power by the elite interest in the status quo. More
importantly, this concentration of power can also perpetuate itself across time by the incentive
for other, newer, elites to maintain the system that will now benefit them.
The Venezuelan post-colonial experience certainly bears this prediction out. Following the
breakdown of the pan-American, pan-nationalist project, Gran Colombia, the nation of
Venezuela began its formative institutional experiences under the lead of a general and the
economic elites who supported him (Tarver & Frederick, 2005). The military-ruler, or caudillo,
though varying in name (and sometimes not even), maintained the inertia behind colonial
Venezuelan politics throughout the 19th and portions of the 20th centuries. This was evident
through the various conflicts between the many attempts to overthrow existing leaders, but also
by the personalist nature of the caudillo, which inevitably emphasized the person in control over
the rule of law (Tarver & Frederick, 2005).
At a minimum, the extractive narrative can be seen politically throughout Venezuela’s
history, but as Acemoglu and Robinson argue, extends to the economic realm as well. This point
is best evident in relation to Venezuela’s oil. Among those members of the Organization for
Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC, Venezuela holds the most reserves:

Figure 1: “OPEC share of world crude oil
reserves, by country”, OPEC Annual
Statistical Bulletin, 2014
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While oil has historically been able to buoy governments and spur social investment (e.g.
Saudi Arabia), Venezuela’s population continues to score worse than many other OPEC
countries in poverty indexes, despite oil prices shifting from $8 a barrel in 1999 to $147 in 2008
(Hammond, 2011):

Figure 2: Rankings of OPEC members: lowest number of population beneath the poverty line, Robinson Country
Risk Index

Venezuelan oil policy in this context can be understood through the Punto Fijo era. In 1958,
the two main parties at the time -Accion Democratica (AD) and COPEI- agreed to share power
to the exclusion all other lesser parties (Vanden & Prevost, 2014). This alliance provided
stability during the 1970’s and 1980’s, but the centralizing of power without the pluralizing of it
opened the door to stagnation and corruption, solidified by oil revenues (Vanden & Prevost,
2014). While having availability of incredibly lucrative natural resources within Venezuela’s
borders in the 20th century, this institutional disconnect from their use for prosperity of the
general citizenry points out the trail etched by extractive economic institutions in the 18th and
19th centuries.
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Chavez’ appointment to the presidency in 1998 sought to act as a rebuke to the development
of political institutions in Venezuela. He ascended to office on the premise of subverting the
established order of Punto Fijo, and that he did (Buxton, 2005). Proclaiming Venezuela a
“Bolivarian Democracy”, Chavez oversaw a rewriting of the constitution and a reorganizing of
the government around statist principles (Faria, 2008). In addition, he makes colonialism a
central theme of his ideology, although against a different ‘empire’, the United States
(Economist, 2013). Indicators of private-sector dominance in the Venezuelan economy certainly
bear this out, with low scores reflecting a minimal amount of private market activity:

Figure 3: “Measure of market dominance, by number of private firms”, Robinson Country Risk Index

Ironically, part of the reason that Chavez began to experience greater opposition was because
of sentiment that he was beginning to centralize and make use of power similarly to the
oligarchical party politics of before, seen between AD and COPEI (Faria, 2008). Acknowledging
their critique, Chavez sought to distinguish himself through the revolutionary rationale of
subverting those same “interests of the oligarchical sectors” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).
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And so, by that logic President Chavez sought to consolidate power. The judiciary became
another example by which Chavez attempted to assert further political control, through
legislation expanding the courts, while also being able to remove those who were seen as
opposing him (Vanden & Prevost, 2014). Again, detractors here argued that Chavez was merely
repeating the politicization done by the Punto Fijo era, whereby wealthy individuals could be
given the ‘correct’ ruling by going to the ‘correct judge’ (Vanden & Prevost, 2014).
With the death of President Chavez in 2013, the push for freedom from imperial and colonial
dynamics came full circle, with many Venezuelans decrying the executive overreach embodied
in his personality-centered statism. By polarizing society has he did, Chavez increased
politicization on the basis of his ideology, being so pushed to accomplish political representation
of ordinary Venezuelans that the authoritarian process used to implement change begins to
resemble the oligarchic capture reminiscent to many Venezuelans (Vanden & Prevost, 2014).
As a result, in terms of political inclusivity, the nation is at a cross roads. Currently,
President Maduro’s administration is in a fight for legitimacy, barely winning the last electionsby 1.5%- and aggravating further by unilateral decision-making (Sullivan, 2014). Indeed,
Maduro’s authoritarianism is not without precedent; his aggressiveness as president can (and has
been) reflected to show a broader trend in elite control, begun by colonialism, maintained
through the caudillo era, but more contemporaneously reasserted through the Punto Fijo regime
and its overthrow (Faria, 2008).
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After critical analysis, it still seems that the colonial political and economic institutions that
were established by the Spanish centuries ago across Latin America continue to endure today.
These institutions began as a quest for extraction of primary goods such as gold, silver, copper,
and cotton, but have managed to persist in today’s Latin economies:

Table 4: "Exports of primary products as a percentage of
the total" Victor Thomas, the Economic History of Latin
America since Independence

The above data fits within the theoretical framework put forward by Acemoglu and
Robinson, whereby institutions that are not inclusive become extractive and exclusive,
concentrating the economic and political gains among a few. Despite Hugo Chavez’s conviction,
President Maduro has to contend with a Venezuelan society that remains poor, polarized, and
with a government and economy centralized around the state but seen as exclusive to many. A
framework based around Acemoglu and Robinson’s would emphasize reforming the incentives
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around these two broad areas. So while Hugo Chavez seems validated in his broader historical
logic of colonial/elite institutions persisting, assuring their reform will be the more daunting task
ahead.
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